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ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Harding Was Afforded Due Process and Equal Protection Under the
Law as Directed By This Court Pursuant to Its Constitutional Authority.
Mr. Harding claims he was denied a full and fair hearing, including the

opportunity to confront witnesses, and because of this was denied the right of
constitutional due process. See Brief of Respondent at 11-15. This claim is without
merit.
This Court's Order of Reference correctly points out that "[p]ursuant to Rule 6,
Rujes_of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, this Court has exclusive authority to review
the [attorney] licensure status of Ray Harding, Jr." based on his status as a former judge
and the fact that the allegations of misconduct occurred while he was a sitting judge.
Order of Reference, March 25, 2003; see also Rule 6(c), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability ("RLDD").

The Order of Reference directed the Office of Professional

Conduct ("OPC") "to proceed with a disciplinary review [of Mr. Harding] under its
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr. Harding's
license to practice law to be submitted directly to [the Supreme Court] for final action."
Order of Reference, March 25, 2003. The "ordinary rules" are the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the RLDD, and the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards").
Based thereon, the OPC initiated an informal complaint against Mr. Harding
pursuant to its authority under Rule 10(a)(1) of the RLDD. See Notice of Informal
Complaint at 1. This was preceded by an OPC investigation pursuant to Rule 4(b)(2) of
the RLDD which resulted in the service of a Notice of Informal Complaint on Mr. Harding
on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD. See id. Furthermore,
in accordance with Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD, the OPC's Notice of Informal Complaint

"identified with particularity the possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional
C o n d u c t . . . as preliminarily determined by OPC counsel." Rule 10(a)(5), RLDD; see
also Notice of Informal Complaint at 1-5.
The RLDD permit a respondent 20 days for response to the Notice of Informal
Complaint.

See Rule 10(a)(5), RLDD; see also Notice of Informal Complaint at 4.

However, the OPC agreed to allow Mr. Harding additional time to respond, and Mr.
Harding did respond to the Notice of Informal Complaint by letter dated September 5,
2003.

See Rule 10(a)(5), RLDD; see also Harding Response to Notice of Informal

Complaint at 1. After reviewing Mr. Harding's response, and because the OPC could
not resolve or dismiss the matter pursuant to the standards of Rule 10(a)(6) of the
RLDD, the OPC served a Calendar Notice on Mr. Harding for a hearing before a
Screening Panel of this Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee ("Screening Panel").
See Calendar Notice; see also Rule 3, RLDD. The Screening Panel hearing was set for
and held on January 22, 2004.

See Screening Panel Decision Sheet with

Recommendation.
The procedures for Screening Panel hearings are set forth in the following
provisions of Rule 10 of the RLDD:
(b) Proceedings before committee and screening panels.
(1) Review and investigation. A screening panel shall review all informal
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts
developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation and
hearing, and the recommendations of OPC counsel.
(2) Respondent's appearance. Before any action is taken which may
result in the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal
complaint, the screening panel shall, upon at least fourteen (14) days
notice, afford the respondent an opportunity to appear before the
screening panel and testify under oath, together with any witnesses
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called by the respondent, and to present an oral argument with
respect to the informal complaint. All testimony shall be recorded and
preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and in any event, not
less than six (6) months following the hearing. A written brief may also
be submitted to the screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall
not exceed five (5) pages in length unless permission for enlargement
is extended by the chair or the chair's delegate for good cause shown.
A copy of the brief shall be forwarded by OPC counsel to the
complainant.
(3) Complainant's appearance. A complainant shall have the right to
appear before the screening panel personally and testify under oath,
together with any witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to
the informal complaint or in opposition to the matters presented by the
respondent. The complainant may be represented by counsel or some
other representative.
(4) Right to hear evidence. The complainant and the respondent shall
each have the right to be present during the presentation of the
evidence unless excluded by the screening panel chair for good
cause shown.
These procedures were followed. Additionally, although not required to do so by the
RLDD, for the convenience of the Screening Panel and all respondents, including Mr.
Harding, the OPC submits a Screening Panel Memorandum to outline the facts, provide
appropriate legal analysis, and determinations of its investigation. See Screening Panel
Memorandum. Such a Screening Panel Memorandum was served on Mr. Harding and
Mr. Harding responded to it.

See Harding Response to OPC Screening Panel

Memorandum.
Mr. Harding participated at the hearing, he testified, he presented witnesses, he
presented evidence, and his counsel presented argument.

See e.g. Respondent's

Screening Panel Witness List. The OPC concedes that Mr. Harding was not allowed to
cross-examine witnesses and that all witness questioning was done by the Screening
Panel members. However, the RLDD, promulgated by the Supreme Court, do not

o

require "cross examination" or direct questioning of witnesses by a party as a
requirement of a "fair" hearing and due process in an attorney discipline matter. See in
re Kline D. Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 586 (Utah 1980) (in addressing the due process
afforded an attorney in an attorney discipline matter, the Court stated: "The action
[attorney discipline action] is not an action at law in the strict sense nor a suit in equity.
The attorney against whom the accusations have been made is entitled to a fair hearing
and the right to present such evidence as he may be able to produce to rebut, or
overcome the allegations of misconduct; . . ."). At the Screening Panel hearing, both
the OPC and Mr. Harding were allowed to suggest any area of questioning of any
witness that the Screening Panel members did not cover. Thus, even without crossexamination, Mr. Harding cannot truly state he lacked the opportunity to confront
witnesses. And, both prior to and during the hearing, Mr. Harding had an opportunity to
know all that he must to meet, rebut, or overcome the allegations of misconduct.
It should also be noted that, in the OPC's view, Mr. Harding's claim of a right to
cross-examine witnesses is based on an erroneous analogy of attorney discipline
proceedings to criminal proceedings where there is such a right. This Court has made it
very clear, however, that "Bar disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature. . ." In re
Babilis. 951 P.2d 207, 214 (Utah 1997) (quoting In re McCune. 717 P.2d 701, 707 (Utah
1986) and In re Brown, 906 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Cal. 1995)); see ajso Rule 17(a), RLDD.
Thus, such an analogy is misplaced.
Additionally, Mr. Harding claims he was denied equal protection because, unlike
other respondents, he was denied a District Court hearing. This claim is also without
merit. The Court has long since held that "the practice of law is not a right accredited all
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citizens, but is a privilege extended only upon showing good character, meeting
required qualifications and maintaining proper professional standards."

In re Grant

MacFarlane Sr„ 350 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1960); see also In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583
(Utah 1980). Through its constitutional charge to "govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law," this Court has the authority to promulgate the procedures for the discipline of
persons admitted to practice law. See Utah Const, at VIII, § 4; see also In re Johnson,
48 P.3d 881, 886 (Utah 2001); In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997). The Court
exercised this authority by promulgating the RLDD.
Nothing in the Constitution or the current rules precludes this Court from
bypassing a District Court determination in an attorney disciplinary case, especially in
light of Rule 6(c)'s assertion of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a
former judge where all the misconduct allegations occurred while he was a sitting judge.
Furthermore, the ultimate power of discipline of any attorney constitutionally lies with
this Court, and in such actions, the District Court acts only as this Court's agent. See Jn
re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 886 (2001 Utah).

Accordingly, the Court is within its

constitutional authority to designate the Screening Panel as its "agent" in this case, and
doing so did not deprive Mr. Harding of due process or equal protection.
II.

This Court Should Draw Different Inferences From the Facts as Found
By the Screening Panel, and Make an Independent Judgment That Mr.
Harding Either Should Be Disbarred or Suspended for a Three- or TwoYear Period.
This Court has a different role in attorney discipline cases than in other civil

cases on appeal. It has stated:

[I]n light of our constitutional mandate and "the unique nature of
disciplinary actions and our knowledge of the nature of the practice of
law," we accord less deference to the findings of a lower tribunal. "We . . .
reserve the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ from
the inferences drawn by the [lower tribunal]." Although we recognize as a
general proposition the district court's advantaged position in overall
familiarity with the evidence and the context of the case, on appeal we
must treat the ultimate determination of discipline as our responsibility.
"In this regard, it is imperative to bear in mind that the review of attorney
discipline proceedings is fundamentally different from judicial review of
administrative proceedings," id., or of other district court cases.
In sum, this Court will ordinarily presume that the [lower tribunal's] findings
of fact are correct, although we may set those findings aside if they are not
supported by the evidence. If the evidence warrants, we may make an
independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline,
although we always give serious consideration to the findings and [rulings]
of the [district court].
In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997); see ajso Order, In re Ray Harding, Jr.,
Case No. 20020535-SC (where the Court stated its intent to consider the full range of
disciplinary sanctions available).
The OPC has not challenged the factual findings of the Screening Panel.
However, as set forth in its initial Brief, the OPC considers that the Screening Panel
erred in concluding that Mr. Harding did not violate Rule 8.4(a) and (d) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct; that the Screening Panel erred in finding that there were no
aggravating circumstances; that the Screening Panel erred by according too much
weight to those in mitigation; and that the Screening Panel erred in recommending that
the appropriate sanction should be a five-year probation. As outlined in its initial Brief,
the OPC contends that this Court should draw a different inference from the evidence
and determine that Mr. Harding either should be disbarred, or suspended for a three- or
two-year period.
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III.

The Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Attorney Discipline Matter Because It
Made No Final Determination on Mr. Harding's Judicial Misconduct.
Rule 6(c) of the RLDD states:
A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as a lawyer but also
for misconduct that occurred while the lawyer was a judge and would have
been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided that the misconduct was not
the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding as to which there has been
a final determination by the Supreme Court.
Mr. Harding's misconduct was the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding,

but the Court never finally disposed of that proceeding because Mr. Harding resigned
his judgeship. See letter of resignation from Mr. Harding, Feb. 28, 2003. Indeed, the
Final Order of this Court stated that its consideration of the Utah Judicial Conduct
Commission's recommended sanction of removal "has become moot" based on Mr.
Harding's resignation. See Final Order, March 25, 2003.
The Court's statement that Mr. Harding is permanently disqualified from serving
in any judicial or quasi-judicial position in the State of Utah appears to be consistent
with Mr. Harding's condition of resignation - that is, Mr. Harding stated that he "will not
seek judicial office in the future." See Harding letter of resignation. Thus, the Court's
statement was not a determination of misconduct but rather an acceptance of Mr.
Harding's offer.
The OPC concedes that if Mr. Harding had not resigned and this Court had
adjudicated Mr. Harding's misconduct after consideration of the recommendation of the
Utah Judicial Conduct Commission, Mr. Harding might have had a colorable argument
of lack of jurisdiction under Rule 6(c) of the RLDD. However, this is not the case.

IV.

Although the OPC Recognizes the Role of Lawyers Helping Lawyers in
Assisting Lawyers With Substance Abuse, Addiction, or Mental Health
Issues, Its Role in Attorney Discipline Matters Should Be Confined to Any
Evidence It Can Provide in Accordance With the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions.
The OPC understands that Lawyers Helping Lawyers has filed a Motion for

Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief. The OPC responds as follows:
The OPC appreciates the work and involvement of the Lawyers Helping Lawyers
Program in assisting lawyers with substance abuse, addiction, or mental health issues.
Certainly if these issues can be addressed prior to misconduct, everyone is well served.
In the OPC's view, however, once misconduct has occurred, the role of Lawyers
Helping Lawyers in the attorney discipline process should be limited to pertinent
evidence for consideration under the Standards. There is no attorney discipline rule to
provide a basis for an expansion of the role of Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program in this
case or in any other attorney discipline case.
Mr. Richard Uday, Director of the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program, provided
helpful testimony to the Screening Panel with respect to Mr. Harding's substance abuse
and his claim of a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation. See
Rule 6.3(i), Standards. Mr. Uday also testified regarding his personal contact with Mr.
Harding and Mr. Harding's contacts with the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program.
Because all these contacts were with Mr. Harding after he committed misconduct, the
evidence provided through Mr. Uday should only be considered under the Standards.
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It should also be noted that since the Lawyers Helping Lawyers role is limited to
individual cases, Mr. Harding's case will not have a tremendous impact on the
effectiveness of the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program in other cases.
CONCLUSION
The issue before this Court is the appropriate attorney discipline sanction to be
imposed on Mr. Ray Harding Jr. for misconduct that occurred while he was a sitting
state court judge. This Court has clear exclusive constitutional authority and jurisdiction
to determine what the appropriate attorney discipline sanction should be.

This

jurisdictional authority is expressed in the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. At
the end of Mr. Harding's judicial disciplinary proceeding, this Court maintained
jurisdiction over Mr. Harding's case because it had made no determination of
misconduct: Mr. Harding resigned before this Court made a final determination of
misconduct.
Furthermore, this Court has properly directed that Mr. Harding's misconduct be
initially considered in accordance with the attorney discipline rules with the final decision
to be made by the Court. Pursuant to the attorney discipline rules, Mr. Harding was
provided notice and a fair hearing before a Screening Panel of this Court's Ethics and
Discipline Committee. At the hearing, Mr. Harding testified, presented witnesses for
questioning by the Screening Panel, was allowed to suggest areas for questioning all
witnesses, including OPC witnesses, and was allowed to offer evidence and argument
to rebut the OPC or otherwise support his position. Nothing in the Constitution requires
cross-examination of witnesses to constitute a fair hearing in attorney discipline cases.
Similarly, based on this Court's constitutional authority, a lawyer's equal protection is

not violated by this Court designating a Screening Panel to conduct a hearing in lieu of
the District Court in cases where the lawyer's misconduct occurred while he was a
sitting judge.
The OPC did not challenge the Screening Panel's factual findings, but disagrees
with its conclusion that the appropriate sanction for Mr. Harding is a five-year probation.
In the OPC's viewpoint, based on the evidence, the appropriate sanction should be
disbarment or a three- or two-year suspension.
Finally, although the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program fills a valuable role in
helping those with substance abuse, addiction, or mental health issues, when its
involvement is after misconduct has occurred, as in this case, its role in the disciplinary
proceedings should be limited to the evidence that it might provide in mitigation under
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
DATED: April 2 2

,2004.
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Billy L. Walker
Senior Counsel
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 22- day 0 f April, 2004, I caused to be mailed via
United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief
to Gregory G. Skordas and Jack M. Morgan, Jr., counsel for the Respondent/Appellee,
at the following address: SKORDAS & CASTON, LLC, Boston Building, Suite 1104, 9
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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SUPPLEMENTAL ADDENDUM

Calendar Notice
Final Order
Harding's Letter of Resignation

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of the
Complaint by

)
)

Office of Professional Conduct
against
Ray Harding, Jr.,
Attorney at Law

CALENDAR NOTICE
)

03-0417
)

)

To: The above-named Complainant and Respondent:
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") has referred the
above-identified informal complaint for review by a Screening Panel of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee of the Supreme Court.
The Screening Panel is appointed by the Utah Supreme Court to hear and consider
complaints filed against Respondents for alleged violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. This panel has the authority to dismiss the complaint(s), dismiss with
condition(s), issue a caution to the Respondent, issue a private admonishment to the
Respondent, issue a public reprimand to the Respondent, or determine that there is
probable cause to authorize filing a formal complaint against the Respondent for further
proceedings. The Screening Panel in disciplinary matters is concerned only with the
Respondent's alleged conduct and cannot order restitution for repayment of money or a
judgment against the Respondent.
Pursuant to Rule 10(b)(1) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
("RLDD"), as amended January 1, 2003, the Screening Panel has the authority to make
its determination based on facts developed by the informal complaint, answer,
investigation, the OPC recommendation, and in the Screening Panel hearing. In this
respect, facts developed at the hearing may give rise to a determination of Rules of
Professional Conduct violations not previously alleged in the Notice of Informal
Complaint(s) in this matter.
The Screening Panel will conduct a hearing in this matter on Thursday, January
22, 2004 beginning at 1:00 p.m. at the Utah Law and Justice Center at 645 South 200
East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Please note that it would be advisable that you arrive fifteen
minutes prior to the time set for your case so that if a case scheduled before your case
ends early, you will be ready to proceed earlier than your appointed time. Each case
will be set to be heard in a maximum one and a one-half hour time period.

Page 2 of 4
Complainants and Respondents will be allowed to present their case as set forth
below within this maximum time period. If a Complainant or Respondent feels that
additional time is needed for their case to be heard, a written request for this additional
time must be made to the OPC within five working days from the date of this Calendar
Notice. The written request must specify with particularity the reasons for the additional
time. The OPC will forward the request for additional time to the Chair or Vice Chair of
the Screening Panel, who will announce at the time and place set for the hearing whether
additional time will be allowed.
Prior to every case the members of the Screening Panel will have had an
opportunity to review all of the information submitted by the parties so that in most cases,
one and one-half hour per case will be sufficient time to allow the parties to summarize
their positions, answer the Screening Panel's questions, and elaborate on what they feel
are important pieces of information. After the hearing, the Panel will deliberate and make
a decision concerning the case.
Pursuant to Rule 10(b)(2) of the RLDD, the Respondent is hereby afforded an
opportunity to appear before the Screening Panel and testify under oath, together with any
witnesses called by the Respondent, and to present an oral argument with respect to the
informal complaint. All testimony will be recorded and preserved so long as proceedings
are pending. In advance of the hearing, Respondents may submit a written brief, not to
exceed five pages in length unless prior permission is obtained, and the OPC shall forward
a copy to the Complainant.
Pursuant to Rules 10(b)(3) and (4) of the RLDD, the Complainant has the right to
appear before the Screening Panel and to testify under oath, together with any witnesses
called by the Complainant. The Complainant may be represented by counsel or some
other representative. The Complainant and the Respondent each have the right to be
present during the presentation of evidence unless they are excluded from the hearing by
the Screening Panel Chair or Vice Chair for good cause shown.
Please be advised that Rule 32(b) of the RLDD provides that "[i]f the
Respondent, having been ordered by the Committee to appear and having received
actual notice of that order, fails to appear, the Respondent shall have been deemed to
have admitted the factual allegations which were the subject of such appearance. The
Committee shall not, absent good cause, continue or delay proceedings because of
Respondent's failure to appear."
In this respect, this Calendar Notice is the
Committee's order requiring the Respondent to appear. If the Respondent does not
appear, the OPC may request that the factual allegations in this matter be deemed
admitted.
For good cause, the Complainant, the Respondent, and any witnesses may
arrange in advance to appear at the hearing by telephone. If you need to request to
appear by telephone, call Amy Yardley at 801-531-9110. Billy L. Walker is the attorney
assigned to this case.
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Requests by the Respondent for continuances from the above-set Screening
Panel hearing date, unless stipulated to by the OPC, shall be made in writing through
the OPC to the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. Upon
consideration of the position of the OPC and the reasons for the Respondent's request
for the continuance, the Chair or Vice Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee shall
decide whether to grant the continuance.
Scheduled Panel members are:
Denver Snuffer, Attorney at Nelson, Snuffer, Dahler and Poulsen
Julie K. Morriss, Attorney Morriss, Bateman, O'Bryant and Compagni
Justin Toth, Attorney at Ray, Quinney and Nebeker
Bruce Jackson, Public (non-attorney) Member

DATED: December _ 2 _ ^ £ , 2003.
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Kate A. Toomey
Deputy Counsel
Telephone: (801)531-9110
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ]2> day of December, 2003, I mailed via
United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, the foregoing Calendar Notice to:
Ray Harding, Jr.
c/o Greg Skordas
9 Exchange Place #1104
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-000O000-

In re:

Judicial Conduct Commission
Inquiry Concerning a Judge;
03-4D-006

Case No. 20030173-SC

FINAL ORDER

The Court hereby acknowledges the receipt of the recommended
Order of Removal From Office from the Utah Judicial Conduct
Commission in this matter.

In view of the resignation from

judicial office received from Mr. Harding on February 28, 2003,
the recommended sanction of removal has become moot, but the
Court orders that Mr. Harding be permanently disqualified from
serving in any judicial or quasi-judicial position in the State
of Utah.

For^The Court:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the 27th day of March 2003, I mailed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to
the following addresses:
Colin Winchester
Executive Director
Judicial Conduct Commission
645 South 200 East, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ms. Ruth Lybbert, Chairman
Judicial Conduct Commission
645 South 200 East, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-38343
Edward K. Brass
Attorney At Law
175 East 400 South #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

Honorable Christine M. Durham Chief Justice
Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111

Dear Chief Justice Durham:

I hereby resign as a district court judge for the fourth Judicial District. I will not seek
judicial office in the future.
I deeply regret any cloud my personal problems may have cast upon thefinemen and women
who serve in the judiciary of this state. The only person responsible for my situation is me. I
apologize to you, my colleagues, and to the people of Utah, While I am not naive about how history
will regard mc, 1 hope that in some part my legacy will be that I worked hard for many years lo see
that justice was administered fairly to all who appeared before me.

Yours,

w jlymond M.

Harding, Jr.

V

FILED
UTAH SUPREME COURT

FEB 2 8 2003
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT
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